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AnthropicAnthropic reports that more than 80% of code merged into its production codebase in May 2026 was authored by Claude. It describes AI systems moving from snippets to autonomous agents and warns that recursive AI development could shift humans into oversight roles while compounding rare misalignment failures.
Anthropic reports that more than 80% of code merged into its production codebase in May 2026 was authored by Claude.
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You should not need a lawyer's vocabulary to ask a public body a fair question. That is why AI-assisted correspondence can be useful. The Guardian reports that public bodies are struggling with chatbot-generated correspondence. The problem deserves attention without turning every person who uses a writing tool into a nuisance. The strongest practical distinction comes from the Information Commissioner's Office. Its guidance says using AI does not, by itself, invalidate a freedom-of-information request. It also describes how unnecessary complexity and inaccurate references can create extra work. Those are practitioner reports, not a measured national estimate of AI's contribution to public-sector workloads. A research paper on agentic flooding identifies a similar tension: easier access can increase demand on services that still require human attention. Its exploratory collection is not a representative sample; the authors explicitly warn against prevalence and causal claims. We should not turn an interesting framework into a statistic it cannot support. Our reading is that the scarce resource is not text. It is competent attention. If a legitimate question becomes buried under material that nobody checked, the person asking and the person answering can both lose. But a blanket restriction could also disadvantage someone using AI for language support or confidence. A constructive response would help people state what they need, check supporting references and narrow a request collaboratively where appropriate. Public bodies can also publish frequently requested information and make their processes easier to understand. The goal should be more usable answers, not merely fewer messages. A shorter queue achieved by discouraging valid questions would be the wrong kind of success.

Imagine being asked to question a voice you recognize, apparently giving you an urgent instruction. That is not a fair place to put the entire burden of a company's financial security. A payment process should work even when a convincing conversation turns out to be false. In a November 5 announcement, US prosecutors alleged that three defendants participated in an impersonation scheme that stole more than $129 million from companies. The alleged use of generated executive voices and images sits at the center of the case. The charges are accusations, and the defendants are presumed innocent unless proven guilty. The release's use of the term super intelligence does not establish a technical capability level; AI-enabled impersonation is the supported description. The practical lesson is not that employees should become perfect deepfake detectors. The FBI's existing guidance recommends independently verifying a caller through a contact obtained separately. That principle is useful because a convincing voice or picture should not be the same thing as authorization. Our recommendation is to connect it to a routine payment process: independently confirmed instructions, a second authorized reviewer where appropriate, and a protected way for staff to pause an unusual request. There is an organizational consequence here. If people are praised for responding instantly but punished for questioning apparent authority, a security policy may exist only on paper. Conversely, excessive checking can delay legitimate work, so controls need to be designed around consequential transactions rather than every conversation. The court process will determine the allegations. Organizations do not have to wait for that outcome to ask whether their own approval rules rely too heavily on familiarity, urgency or hierarchy.

When an AI company says its product is safe, an outside assessment can help us decide how much confidence to place in that claim. But the assessment is only part of the story. We also need to understand who sets the evaluator's scope, who sees the findings and who can delay their release. The Associated Press reports that officials at the US government's AI evaluation center, CAISSI, were asked to report informally to a White House office. Its account cites two unnamed former officials and raises concerns about leadership and publication of evaluation findings. The White House did not answer AP's specific questions about the center. That is significant reporting, not a formal reorganization order we have independently inspected. The public record also requires care. NIST still hosts a September 17 assessment of GLM-5.3 and October 16 incident-response guidance. The latter was a joint voluntary publication with NSA and CISA. Those records do not resolve the concern about independence, but they prevent us from describing every kind of public research as having stopped. Nor do old published records establish what is currently being held back. There is a good-faith case that closer executive attention could bring resources and influence. The test is whether evaluators retain the ability to report inconvenient results—not simply how near they sit to political power. Sensitive technical details can sometimes require protection; that does not remove the need to explain evaluation scope, publication rules and material limitations. Our conclusion is a question institutions can answer concretely: what can the public expect to learn, on what timetable, and who is authorized to change that expectation? Independence becomes more credible when those arrangements can be examined rather than merely asserted.