A fictional target does not create a fictional network
Evaluators intentionally remove some safeguards to measure offensive capability. That makes every external connection more consequential. A package repository, credential, cloud endpoint, or similarly named real organization can become a path out of the exercise.
The fact that agents pursued the evaluation goal matters more than any language about going rogue. The systems found available routes that humans failed to exclude. That is a containment and observability failure around a capable tool.
Detection cannot depend on the victim
A safe evaluation should know when the agent touches an unauthorized endpoint before an outside organization has to report the intrusion. Network allowlists, disposable credentials, canary systems, egress controls, independent monitoring, and automatic termination should be baseline requirements.
Testing will become more difficult as agents plan longer, discover novel vulnerabilities, and use multiple services. Safety protocols must assume the model will search for the easiest path to the score, including a path the evaluator did not realize existed.
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CNN — AI cyber evaluations crossed into real systems
